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Abstract
In today’s terrorism-prone and security-focused world, evacuation emergencies, drills, and
false alarms are becomingmore andmore common. Compliance to an evacuation ordermade by
an authority in case of emergency can play a key role in the outcome of an emergency. In case an
evacuee experiences repeated emergency scenarios which may be a false alarm (e.g., an evacua-
tion drill, a false bomb threat, etc.) or an actual threat, the Aesop’s cry wolf effect (repeated false
alarms decrease order compliance) can severely affect his/her likelihood to evacuate. To analyse
this key unsolved issue of evacuation research, a game-theoretic approach is proposed. Game
theory is used to explore mutual best responses of an evacuee and an authority. In the proposed
model the authority obtains a signal of whether there is a threat or not and decides whether to
order an evacuation or not. The evacuee, after receiving an evacuation order, subsequently de-
cideswhether to stay or leavebased onposterior beliefs that have beenupdated in response to the
authority’s action. Best-responses are derived and Sequential equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium are used as solution concepts (refining equilibria with the intuitive criterion). Model
results highlight the benefits of announced evacuation drills and suggest that improving the ac-
curacy of threat detection can prevent large inefficiencies associated with the cry wolf effect.
Keywords: Evacuation, Emergency, Cry wolf effect, Game theory, Safety policy
I. INTRODUCTION
After every evacuation associated with a terrorist attack, a fire, a natural disaster or a human error [1],
investigators struggle to find out if decisions made by authorities or evacuees was appropriate. In
some cases, experts find that a quicker or different response to a threat could have saved a tremen-
dous number of lives. At the same time, the authorities ordering an evacuation and the evacuees have
the difficult task of taking decisions with time pressure and often with only scarce information avail-
able. To date,many tools andmodels havebeendeveloped to represent decisionmakingduring evac-
uation in the context of applied physics research. They include, for example, simulators of pedestrian
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dynamics during evacuation [2–4], which aims at representing humanmovement and associated be-
haviour in case of different scenarios and threats [6,7], ormodels of authority’s recommendations [8].
Human behaviour in evacuation scenarios has also been investigated using Virtual Reality tools, as
they allow the investigation of individual and group decision making during evacuation [9–12]. Ex-
perimental work has been performed in order to validate suchmodels and tools, including the study
of different types of emergent behaviours related to evacuation dynamics [13–17].
The main limitations of these tools is that they consider evacuation scenarios in isolation and
they address only one of the two parties involved in an evacuation, either (i) the decision making of
the authority (i.e. their orders/instructions) or (ii) the actions of the evacuees. In contrast, currently
there is no framework available which is able to comprehensively consider optimal decision making
strategies for an authority and an evacuee at the same time in case of several repeated emergency
evacuation threats.
Many tragedies have demonstrated the dilemmas that decision makers may face when dealing
with emergency situations. For instance, in relation to the Costa Concordia disaster, the Italian court
trial is evaluating the behaviour of captain Schettino who allegedly did not order the evacuation of
the ship on time [18]. Apart from the Captain’s negligence or a simply incorrect assessment of the sit-
uation, the analysis of the trade-offs between the cost of a useless evacuation (i.e., the risk of “ruining”
the holidays to the cruise ship guests for no reason due to a false alarm in the Costa Concordia case)
and the cost of a delayed evacuation have not been accounted for appropriately. Similar challenges
are present in case of emergency evacuations in other sensitive facilities. A known example is the
case of the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks in which instructions to remain in the stricken
building were given to employees working in the WTC during the attack [19]. In contrast, survivors’
accounts demonstrated that in some instances an independent evacuee’s decision made in conflict
with the order received, can save lives.
On the one hand, authorities should not ignore bomb threats given the risk of losing human lives.
On the other hand, multiple unnecessary evacuations (drills, false threats) may lead to a decrease in
the authority credibility and people’s underestimation of threats [20, 21]. This is called the cry wolf
effect in reference to Aesop’s fable The Boy who Cried Wolf in which instruction compliance is de-
creased by a series of false alarms [22]. Repeated unnecessary evacuations also have a high cost to
society, including the risk of letting terrorists achieve their goal, i.e. making people live in fear. Ethi-
cal dilemmas associated with the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of decision making in scenar-
ios which involve human lives at risk have been discussed in different research fields such as road
safety [23] or earthquake engineering [24]. Although the cost of a life has been discussed in different
contexts [25,26], an evaluation of decisionmaking from both the point of view of the evacuee and the
authority has not been conducted systematically in case of emergency evacuation. This is a rising is-
sue, since in a terrorism-prone world, false bomb threats with subsequent evacuations are becoming
more andmore common [27].
The concept of crowd panic in case of evacuation is often employed in the media. In the evac-
uation research community, it is instead known that panic rarely occurs in crowd evacuations [28].
2
Following the debate of the panicmisconception, emergency evacuation research has focused on the
application of different theories andmodels to increase the understanding of isolated decisions. This
includes rationality-based theories of choice such as utility theories [4], the theory of affordances [29]
psychological models [30,31], data-driven [32] or cognitive science-inspiredmodels [33]. Thesemod-
els have shown reasonably good capabilities in capturing human behaviour and decision making
during evacuations. Nevertheless, their major limitations are the boundaries of the system that they
consider, i.e. a single evacuation, a single group of evacuation scenarios in similar conditions or a
specific behaviour in a given condition.
This paper proposes the use of a game-theoretic approach to systematically address evacuation
emergencies. Game theory is suggested here given its unique ability to interpret the interactions be-
tween different intelligent decisionmakers and the opportunity to investigatemutual best responses
in complex systems [34].
Previous attempts to employ game theory to investigate decision making in emergencies have
shown its great potential, but they mostly focused on isolated decisions of only one of the parties
involved. For instance, interesting works on game-theoretic applications have been developed to
study decisions taken by evacuees, e.g. exit selection [35], pedestrianmovement and route choice [17,
36–39], or helpingbehaviors [40]. Similarly, single authority decisions in case of evacuation havebeen
investigated using game theory, e.g., security prevention [41], or risk perception [42]. Nevertheless,
none of the previous studies have investigated systematically the interactions between the decisions
of theauthorities and theactions takenby theevacuees. Theauthority ishere intendedas thedecision
maker (e.g. event safety manager, police officers, etc.) who should decide whether or not to order an
evacuation in case of a perceived threat.
In this paper, we investigate the decisionmaking process in repeated emergency evacuation with
a static game-theoretic approach (EvacuationGame) aimingat studying the impactofdifferent strate-
gies adopted by an authority (A) and a potential evacuee (E) in a situation which involves uncertainty
about the state of nature (i.e. whether there is an actual threat or not). The evacuee has the option to
stay or leave and the authority can decide whether or not to order an evacuation. The payoffs reflect
the costs from the perspective of both A and E.
II. THE EVACUATION GAMEMODEL
Two players are considered in the Evacuation Game: An authority (A) and an evacuee (E). There are
two states of nature, namely thenormal staten and the threat state t . Thenormal staten corresponds
to a situation of no actual (man-made or natural) disaster being imminent. The threat state t refers
to the case in which an actual disaster is taking place.
A. States of Nature
The players share a common prior belief pi ∈ (0,1) that the state of nature is t . Correspondingly, the
common prior belief that the state of nature is n is the probability 1−pi.
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B. Actions
Each of the two players has two actions available: A can choose to either Order an evacuation (O )
or to Not order an evacuation (N ), E can choose to either Leave (L) or Stay (S ). However, E is given
this choice only after A chooses O . If A chooses N , then the only choice available to E is to Stay (S ).
This captures a situation in which evacuees are not directly exposed to threat (e.g. they are not in
the proximity of a fire, so they would not take the decision to leave independently) and their decision
making relies on their compliance (or non-compliance) with the instruction given by A.
C. Available information
The authority A receives information about the state of nature. In particular, A obtains information
in the form of a signal X with two possible realizations corresponding to the two possible states of
nature, i.e. signal xn for state n and signal xt for state t . Such signals represent information re-
ceived from a technological system to detect the threat (e.g. a smoke detector, a clue of an imminent
threat from a camera video). The quality and reliability of the signal (called here signal precision) is
expressed with a variable τ ∈ [1/2,1] (τ is not lower than 1/2 as this case would correspond to a rela-
beling of the signals). This means that if the state of nature is n , then A receives the signal xn with a
probability τ and the signal xt with a probability 1−τ. Similarly, when the state of nature is t , then A
receives a signal xt with a probability τ and xn with a probability 1−τ. The precision τ is assumed
to be commonly known and it depends on the source(s) of information about the threat. We use γt
and γn to denote the authority’s posterior belief that the state is t after receiving the signal xt and xn ,
respectively (see equations (1) and (2)) according to Bayes’ rule. The posterior belief γt is the prob-
ability that the authority assigns to the actual state being a threat, after having received the signal xt
from a technological system. The definition is analogous for γn and xn .
γt = Pr(ω= t |X = xt ) =
piτ
piτ+ (1−pi)(1−τ)
(1)
γn = Pr(ω= t |X = xn ) =
pi(1−τ)
pi(1−τ) + (1−pi)τ
(2)
Note that the evacuee can only observe the action of A (which can also be a lack of action in the
case of non-order to evacuate N ). The Evacuee has no information concerning the signal of A or
the state of nature but is aware of the precision of the threat detection (to a certain extent). This
assumption is made since the evacuee does not have the information available to the authority (e.g.
Amight have received information concerning abomb threat, etc. which is not known to the evacuee)
and is assumed not directly exposed to the threat (e.g. not in the proximity of a fire, etc.). This latter
assumption ismade since it considers themost challenging scenario from an evacuation perspective.
4
D. Timing
Different structures of timing can be used to represent the interactions among E and A. In this in-
stance, we present the most common scenario, i.e., a sequential timing in which the action of the
authority A is evaluated by the evacuee E to take his/her action. This may represent the case of the
sounding of an alarm in a building or an order to evacuate given by staff (or the absence of those).
The timing can therefore be represented as follows:
1. The state of natureω ∈ {n , t } is realised.
2. Givenω, the signal X ∈ {xn , xt } is realised.
3. Given the received signal, the Authority takes an action s ∈ {O ,N } to either order an evacuation
O or to not order an evacuation N .
4. The Evacuee observes the action (or inaction) of the Authority. If s = O , the Evacuee forms a
(posterior) belief α= Pr(ω= t |s =O ) that the state of nature is t using Bayes’ rule.
5. If s =O , the Evacuee takes a decision a ∈ {L ,S}.
6. If s =N , the Evacuee has no other option than to decide to stay S .
7. Payoffs are realised (see section F).
E. Strategies
A strategy m of the Authority A consists of two probabilities (mn ,mt ) ∈ [0,1]
2. The number mi is
the probability with which the Authority A orders an evacuation (s = O ) after observing signal xi ∈
{xn , xt }. The total probability with which the Authority gives the evacuation order s =O is presented
in equation (3).
M =mn ((1−pi)τ+pi(1−τ)) +mt ((1−pi)(1−τ) +piτ) (3)
Let the probability that the Authority observes xt be denoted by yt = (1−pi)(1−τ)+piτ and let the
probability that the Authority observes xn be denoted by yn = (1−pi)τ+pi(1−τ). Equation (3) then
becomes:
M =mn yn +mt yt (4)
The strategy of the Evacuee is a number r ∈ [0,1] expressing the probability with which the Evac-
uee chooses L after the Authority has ordered an evacuation O .
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Table 1: Payoffs for the two players based on the state of nature and action of the Evacuee E
E’s Payoff
State of Nature
t n
E’s Action
L −p ·d E −w E −w E
S −d E 0
A’s Payoff if s =O A’s Payoff if s =N
State of Nature
t n
L −p ·d A −w A − c −w A − c
S −d A − c −c
State of Nature
t n
S −d A 0
F. Payoffs
The payoff matrices presented in Table 1 describe the costs to the Evacuee and the Authority as a
function of the state of nature and the actions taken.
• d E is the cost to E in terms of his/her own possible death, injury and property loss/damage.
• d A is the cost to A in terms of E’s possible death, injury and property loss/damage.
• w E is the cost of the evacuation of E (i.e. E leaving) to E himself/herself. This can represent
different costs suchasa lossofproductivity or income (typical issueof anyevacuationdrill/false
alarm [20]), and possible legal and/or insurance-related costs (in case of a dismissed service).
• w A is the cost to A of the evacuation of E. Also in this case, this relates to loss of productivity,
legal/insurance costs, etc.
• c is the cost that A incurs when it gives an order to evacuate O (i.e., an evacuation order). This
can be associated with the intervention of the police, emergency services, fire brigades, etc.
• p ∈ (0,1) is the probability that E faces death, injury or property losses in case E leaves and the
state is t (despite him/her leaving).
It should be noted that the terms d E and d A (as well asw E andw A) are not necessarily the same since
they can account for different values given to life, injury or property in relation to different factors.
For example, the value given to a loss of life or property by an authority might not match the value
given by an evacuee due to ethical reasons, material vs affective value, etc.
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III. MODEL SOLUTION
We use Sequential Equilibrium (SE) [43] as a solution concept. Inmost cases though, theweaker con-
cept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium(PBE) [44] canbe used instead. Inparticular, there is one specific
case in which the solution concept Sequential Equilibrium is needed to identify plausible posterior
beliefs α for the Evacuee E. This is the case in which the Authority A never orders an evacuation
(mn =mt = 0). We also further refine our set of equilibria by applying the intuitive criterion [45]. The
concept of sequential equilibriumhas been beenwidely adopted in applications of game theory, and
the intuitive criterion is arguably the most common refinement thereof (see e.g. [46] for an introduc-
tion). Experimental support for the relevance of sequential equilibrium is provided by [47–49]. The
latter two studies also indicate that the intuitive criterion is relevant when players have had time to
learn and adapt their behavior.
A. Best response of the Authority
We first obtain the best response of the Authority based on its posterior belief γi that the state of
nature is ω = t conditional on having observed xi (i ∈ {n , t }). The expected payoff to the Authority
choosing s =O after having observed the signal xi is presented in equation (5).
uA(O |xi ) = γi [r (−pd
A −w A) + (1− r )(−d A)]+ (1−γi )[r (−w
A) + (1− r ) ·0]− c (5)
The expectedpayoff of choosing s =N after havingobserved the signal xi is presented in equation
(6).
uA(N |xi ) = γi (−d
A) + (1−γi ) ·0 (6)
The payoff of choosing s =O is strictly larger than the payoff of choosing s =N if and only if:
γi (1−p )rd
A > r w A+ c (7)
Thus the best response of the Authority as a function of its posterior belief γi , conditional on
having observed xi (i ∈ {n , t }), is
mi = 1 only IF γi ≥
r w A+ c
r (1−p )d A
mi ∈ (0,1) only IF γi =
r w A+ c
r (1−p )d A
(8)
mi = 0 only IF γi ≤
r w A+ c
r (1−p )d A
.
A first observation concerning the behaviour of the Authority is the following fact.
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Observation 1. When τ > 1/2, we have that γt > γn . So, equation (8) implies that when τ > 1/2 it
must be that mt ≥mn , in a best response of the Authority. In particular, if the Authority’s strategy is to
Order an evacuationwith positive probability after observing the low-threat signal xn (mn > 0), then it
must be that it certainlyOrders an evacuation under the high-threat signal xt (mt = 1). Similarly, if the
Authority’s strategy is to not Order an evacuation with certainty under the high-threat signal (mt < 1),
then it must be that it certainly does Not order an evacuation under the low-threat signal (mn = 0).
Therefore, we can summarise the Authority’s strategy (mn ,mt ) by using only one variable: the to-
tal probability to order an evacuation M ∈ [0,1]. Equation (9) shows how to calculate the Authority’s
strategy (mn ,mt ) as a function of M .
mt =
¨
M
yt
if M ≤ yt
1 if M > yt
mn =
¨
0 if M ≤ yt
M−yt
yn
if M > yt
(9)
B. Best response of the Evacuee
The strategy of the Evacuee is simply a probability r ∈ [0,1] to Leave after receiving the evacuation
order. The Evacuee’s best response is based on his/her belief α that the state is ω = t . This best
response is given in equation (10).
r = 1 only IF α≥
w E
(1−p )d E
r ∈ (0,1) only IF α=
w E
(1−p )d E
(10)
r = 0 only IF α≤
w E
(1−p )d E
As long asM > 0, the Evacuee’s posterior belief can be calculated using Bayes’ rule, see equation
(11).
α=
pi(τmt + (1−τ)mn )
M
(11)
Given Observation 1 above, it is possible to express α as a function of M ∈ (0, yt ] (see equation
(12)).
α=
¨
γt ifM ≤ yt
γn +
pi(1−pi)(2τ−1)
yn
1
M ifM > yt
(12)
C. Results
This section presents the results of the evacuation game. As a first step all possible sequential equilib-
ria (including equilibria that arise under non-generic parameter configurations) are presented. Sub-
sequently, a process of equlibrium refinement has been conducted using the intuitive criterion [45],
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as well as by ruling out non-generic parameter configurations. Formally, we rule out a strategy pro-
file as being non-generic if it is a part of sequential equilibriumonly under a set of parameter vectors
(configurations) that are of zero Lebesgue measure in the parameter space. Intuitively, generic pa-
rameter configurations are those that do not require “delicate” conditions to hold among the various
parameters (for example, there is no reasonwhy w˜
E
1−p should be exactly equal to γt ). Similarly, we rule
out sets of beliefs of Lebesguemeasure zero, when beliefs are not derived from equilibriumstrategies
via Bayesian updating.
1. All equilibria
In this sectionwepresent all possible sequential equilibria, including all equilibria undernon-generic
parameter configurations, and equilibria that might fail the intuitive criterion. We explain how these
are refined in the following subsection. To simplify the notation, we define the following variables
w˜ A =w A/d A, w˜ E =w E/d E, and c˜ = c /d A.
1. M = 1 (α = pi), r = 1: In this equilibrium the Authority orders the evacuation regardless of
the observed signal, so that the Evacuee’s posterior and prior belief are the same. The Evacuee
Leaves. This equilibrium exists only if
pi≥
w˜ E
1−p
and
γn >
w˜ A+ c˜
1−p
.
2. M = 1 (α = pi), r ∈ (0,1): In this equilibrium the Authority orders the evacuaation regardless of
the ovserved signal. The Evacuee’s prior and posterior beliefs are the same. The Evacuee leaves
with some positive probability r ∈ (0,1). This equilibrium exists only if
r = p
pi=
w˜ E
1−p
and
γn >
w˜ A+ c˜
w˜ E
pi=
w˜ A+ c˜
1−p
.
As γn <pi, for this strategy profile to be an equilibrium, it must be that
w˜ E > w˜ A+ c˜ ⇒ w˜ E > w˜ A
which means that the Evacuee values their work relatively more than the Authority does.
3. M ∈ [yt , 1) (α = γn +
pi(1−pi)(2τ−1)
yn
1
M ), r = 1: In this equilibrium the Authority always orders an
evacuation after observing xt and with some probability mn ∈ [0,1) after observing xn . The
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Evacuee updates his/her belief according to Bayes’s rule. The Evacuee Leaves. This equilibrium
exists only if
M = p
γn =
w˜ A+ c˜
1−p
p ≥ yt
and
p

w˜ E
w˜ A+ c˜
−1

≤
(1−pi)(2τ−1)
1−τ
.
4. M ∈ [yt , 1) (α = γn +
pi(1−pi)(2τ−1)
yn
1
M ), r ∈ (0,1): In this equilibrium the Authority always orders
an evacuation after observing xt and with some probabilitymn ∈ [0,1) after observing xn . The
Evacuee updates his/her belief according to Bayes’s rule. The Evacuee Leaves with some pos-
itive probability r ∈ (0,1). This is the case of the cry wolf effect. This equilibrium exists only
if
r =
c˜
(1−p )γn − w˜ A
α=
w˜ E
1−p
M =
pi(1−pi)(2τ−1)
w˜ E
1−p yn −pi(1−τ)
and
w˜ A+ c˜
1−p
< γn <
w˜ E
1−p
< γt .
5. M = yt (α = γt ), r = 1: In this equilibrium the Authority orders an evacuation if and only if it
observes xt . The Evacuee’s posterior belief is the same as the Authority’s. The Evacuee Leaves.
This is the case of full compliance. This equilibrium exists only if
w˜ A+ c˜
γn
> 1−p ≥max

w˜ E
γt
,
w˜ A+ c˜
γt

.
6. M = yt (α= γt ), r ∈ (0,1): In this equilibrium the Authority orders an evacuation if and only if it
observes xt . The Evacuee’s posterior belief is the same as the Authority’s. The Evacuee Leaves
with some positive probability r ∈ (0,1). This equilibrium exists only if
r ∈

c˜
w˜ E − w˜ A
, 1

p < yt
α= γt =
w˜ E
1−p
and
c˜ + w˜ A < w˜ E ≤ 1−p .
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7. M ∈ (0, yt ) (α = γt ), r = 1: In this equilibrium the Authority orders an evacuation with some
positive probability mt ∈ (0,1) after observing xt and does not order an evacuation after ob-
serving xn . The Evacuee’s posterior belief is the same as the Authority’s. The Evacuee Leaves.
This equilibrium exists only if
M = p
p < yt
γt =
w˜ A+ c˜
1−p
and
w˜ A+ c˜ ≥ w˜ E.
8. M ∈ (0, yt ) (α= γt ), r ∈ (0,1): In this equilibrium the Authority orders an evacuation with some
positive probability mt ∈ (0,1) after observing xt and does not order an evacuation after ob-
serving xn . The Evacuee’s posterior belief is the same as the Authority’s. The Evacuee Leaves
with some positive probability r ∈ (0,1). This equilibrium exists only if
r =
c˜
w˜ E − w˜ A
M =
w˜ E − w˜ A
c˜
p
γt =
w˜ E
1−p
w˜ A+ c˜ < w˜ E
and
p <
c˜
w˜ E − w˜ A
yt .
9. M = 0 (α determined in Sequential Equilibrium), r = 1: In this equilibrium the Authority does
not order an evacuation regardless of the observed signal. The Evacuee holds some (off-the-
equilibrium-path) belief α determined by use of Sequential equilibrium. Sequential Equilib-
rium dictates that plausible beliefs α are only those α ∈ [γn ,γt ]. The Evacuee would Leave if
he/she were to receive an evacuation order. Notice, though, that such an order is never given
in equilibrium. This equilibrium exists only if
α ∈

max

w˜ E
1−p
,γn

,γt

and
w˜ E
1−p
≤ γt ≤
w˜ A+ c˜
1−p
.
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10. M = 0 (α determined in Sequential Equilibrium), r ∈ (0,1): In this equilibrium the Authority
does not order an evacuation regardless of the observed signal. The Evacuee holds some (off-
the-equilibrium-path) belief that after receiving an evacuation order, the state is t with prob-
ability α = w˜ E/(1− p ). The Evacuee would Leave with some positive probability r ∈ (0,1) if
he/she were to receive an evacuation order. Notice, though, that such an order is never given
in equilibrium. This equilibrium exists only if
α=
w˜ E
1−p
r ∈

0,min
§
c˜
γt (1−p )− w˜ A
, 1
ª
w˜ A ≤ γt (1−p )≤ w˜
A+
c˜
r
and
γn (1−p )≤ w˜
E ≤ γt (1−p ).
11. M = 0 (α determined in Sequential Equilibrium), r = 0: In this equilibrium the Authority does
not order an evacuation regardless of the observed signal. The Evacuee holds some (off-the-
equilibrium-path) belief α determined by use of Sequential equilibrium. Sequential Equilib-
rium dictates that plausible beliefs α are only those α ∈ [γn ,γt ]. The Evacuee would Stay if
he/she were to receive an evacuation order. Notice, though, that such an order is never given
in equilibrium. This equilibrium exists only if
α ∈

γn ,min

γt ,
w˜ E
1−p

and
γn ≤
w˜ E
1−p
.
2. Refinement of equilibria
We first refine the equilibria withM = 0 by using the intuitive criterion [45] to pin down the players’
beliefs. This criterion is applied to our case in order to rule out equilibria which are such that if the
Authority deviates and gives an evacuation order then the Evacuee assigns positive probability on
the authority having observed xn , despite the fact that an authority who has observed xn would not
find it beneficial to give an evacuation order even if the evacuee would decide to Leave for sure after
receivingO , and anauthoritywhohasobserved xt wouldfind it beneficial to give an evacuationorder
if the Evacuee was to Leave for sure after receiving O .
In particular, when γn ≤
w˜ A
1−p ≤ γt , the only plausible beliefs (according to the intuitive criterion)
are α = γt , since only the xt -type Authority has a possible incentive to order an evacuation. In this
case, the only remaining equilibria withM = 0 are:
12
9’. M = 0, r = 1, α= γt (when γt =
w˜ A+c˜
1−p >max
¦
γn ,
w˜ E
1−p
©
)
10’. M = 0, r ∈ [0, c˜
(1−p )γt−w˜ A
], α= γt (when γt =
w˜ E
1−p >
w˜ A+c˜
1−p > γn )
11’. M = 0, r = 0, α= γt (when
w˜ E
1−p > γt >
w˜ A+c˜
1−p > γn )
The cases 9’ and 10’ are non-generic among the above cases. Therefore, this means that if γn <
w˜ A+c˜
1−p < γt , the only equilibrium under generic parameter configurations where both Authority types
would not give an evacuation order is 11’, i.e., the case where w˜
E
1−p > γt . In this case the Evacuee can
never be convinced to leave.
In a second step, we consider all equilibria andwe proceed with further refinement by identifying
and ruling out non-generic configurations. Cases 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 are non-generic in the sense that
they require certain specific conditions among the different parameters which are unlikely to hold.
We also argue that case 10 is non-generic as it involves the Evacuee holding knife-edge beliefs about
the state of nature off the equilibrium path. Case 1 involves the Authority giving an evacuation order
all the time and the Evacuee being willing to leave based on the prior alone. This is quite implausible
because this means that the threat is so big and the signal technology so inaccurate that both parties
would rather have the Evacuee Leave in the first place.
Table 2 presents all sequential equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion under the various
generic parameter configurations. The value of M ∗ that appears in the table is given in Equation
(13).
M ∗ =
pi(1−pi)(2τ−1)
w˜ E
1−p yn −pi(1−τ)
(13)
Note that M ∗ ∈ (yt , 1) for the parameter configurations for which it is relevant. In these cases, the
Authority is very prone to order an evacuation.
The cry wolf effect is present in situations where realizations of both signals xn and xt induce
the authority to give an evacuation order with some positive probability (M > yt ) and the Evacuee
does not always play L (Leave) when receiving the order of evacuation O i.e. case 4. In particular,
this happens in cases where (i) w˜
A+c˜
1−p < γn and (ii)
w˜ A
1−p ∈ (γn ,γt ). The first condition indicates that
the authority wants the Evacuee Leave regardless of whether it obtained signal xn or signal xt . The
second condition indicates that the Evacuee is willing to leave if he/she believes that the state is t
with probability γt , and is willing to stay if he/she believed that the state is t with probability γn . This
leads to inefficiencies as the interests of the Authority and the Evacuee are not perfectly aligned.
In contrast, the ideal situation is the one where the Authority gives the order to evacuate if, and
only if he/she receives the threat signal xt (M = yt ), and the Evacuee always Leaves when he/she
receives the evacuation order (r = 1). This is the case in which w˜
A+c˜
1−p ∈ (γn ,γt ) and
w˜ E
1−p < γt , i.e.
case 5.
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Table 2: Equilibria under different parameter configurations. The top row and the leftmost column
list parameter ranges while the remaining cells describe the possible equilibria (strategies M and
r of the Authority and the Evacuee, respectively, as well as the Evacuee’s posterior belief α) for the
correspondingcombinationsofparameters. Casenumbers refer to theequilibria of sections III.C.1–2.
w˜ A+c˜
1−p > γt
w˜ A+c˜
1−p ∈ (γn ,γt )
w˜ A+c˜
1−p < γn
w˜ E
1−p > γt
M = 0 M = 0 M = 0
α ∈ [γn ,γt ] α= γt α ∈ [γn ,γt ]
r = 0 r = 0 r = 0
(Case 11) (Case 11’) (Case 11)
w˜ E
1−p ∈ (pi,γt )
M = 0 M = yt M =M
∗ > yt
α= w˜
E
1−p
α ∈

w˜ E
1−p ,γt

α ∈

γn ,
w˜ E
1−p

r = c˜
(1−p )γn−w˜ A
(Case 4)
w˜ E
1−p ∈ (γn ,pi)
α= γt M =M
∗ > yt M = 1
r = 1 r = 0 α= w˜
E
1−p α=pi
r = c˜
(1−p )γn−w˜ A
r = 1
(Case 9) (Case 11) (Case 4) (Case 1)
w˜ E
1−p < γn
M = 0 r = 1 M = 1
α ∈ [γn ,γt ] α=pi
r = 1 r = 1
(Case 9) (Case 5) (Case 1)
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Table 3: Parameter values for the case study
Monetary variables Probability variables Accuracy cases
Variable Value (in $) Variable Value Variable Value
d E 1.5×106 pi 5×10−4 τ1 .7
d A 1.5×106 p 1×10−2 τ2 .8
w E 2.0×102 τ3 .9
w A 1.0×102
c 2.0×101
D. Illustrative case study
In order to illustrate ourmodel’s results, we provide an exampleparameterisation of themodel. Table
3 shows the values of all parameters of the model for the case study. It should be noted that the
parametric values of the case study are selected to reflect a possible scenario, but they have not be
linked to a specific type of evacuation (e.g. a fire or a terrorist threat) in order to avoid amis-use of the
assumptions adopted. Our analysis takes three different values of the signal accuracy parameter τ as
each value leads to a different prediction according to the model. These values can reflect different
types of issues such as the type of technology employed to detect the evacuation (e.g. a smoke alarm
or a camera) and its reliability.
The parameterisation uses d A = d E with values being in the ballpark of the estimated value of
statistical life [25,26] i.e., the chosen values reflect credible values adopted in practice. Values for w E
andw A are taken to represent the daily income of a worker (who corresponds to the evacuee) and the
average daily profit per employee of a firm (i.e. per evacuee), respectively. In this case, the cost c rep-
resents the cost of ordering an evacuation per employee. The parameters for pi and p reflect that the
state is, indeed, a threat with a probability of 0.1% and that there is still a 1% chance that an employee
may suffer damages despite him/her attempting to evacuate. Such value is purely hypothetical and
it has been chosen to reflect a scenario in which the chances to have negative consequences in case
of evacuation are low. We are therefore assuming that the evacuation occurs in an effective manner
with a low probability to reach untenable conditions.
Our analysis explores the model’s predictions under different values of the accuracy parameter
τ. When the accuracy is low, τ = τ1 = 0.7, then (1− p )γn > w˜
E > w˜ A + c˜ and we are in case 1 in
which the authority always orders an evacuation — even after observing xn — the evacuee always
evacuates. In this case, the threat detection technology available is not adequate. When the accuracy
is high, τ = τ3 = 0.9, then w˜
E > w˜ A + c˜ > (1 − p )γn and we are in case 5 in which the authority
orders an evacuation if and only if signal xt is observed, the evacuee always complies with the order.
Here, the threat detection technology is sufficiently good to ensure full compliance. Finally, when the
accuracy takes the intermediate value, τ = τ2 = 0.8, then w˜
E > (1−p )γn > w˜
A + c˜ , we are in case 4,
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in which the cry wolf effect is observed: the authority orders an evacuation whenever xt is observed
but also some times when xn is observed. The evacuee responds by complying only partially. The
threat detection technology cannot induce full compliance as the authority cannot determine with
high enough confidence whether there is an actual threat or not.
IV. DISCUSSION
This section analyses all generic cases and discusses their implications. The “bad,” generic cases
where the Authority never gives an evacuation order are the following. The first one involves the cost
of giving the evacuation order being too high (case 9). This is quite implausible since if that was the
case, there should not be an option to give an evacuation order to begin with. The other one (case
11) is one where the Evacuee holds implausible beliefs (γn ≤ α ≤
w˜ E
1−p ≤ γt ; implausible because the
Authority could induce different beliefs and be better off).
It should be noted that in most cases where r < 1, we have that w˜ E > w˜ A (the only exception
arises in case 11 where O is never used by the Authority in equilibrium). This means that in these
cases the Evacuee values his work relativelymore than the Authority does. This relates to cases where
the Evacuee is highly committed in the investment made for his work (i.e. the case in which the
activity and the productivity associated with it has a high cost to the Evacuee when interrupted).
A typical example for such scenario is the Costa Concordia evacuation [18] in which the Authority
assessment of the situation lead to not order the evacuation in time to avoid casualties. Even under
such conditions, if p is low enough, or τ is high enough, the “ideal” situation 5 can be achieved.
The model presented also allows us to reflect on how different types of authorities perform different
evaluations of w˜ A (e.g., a public body such as a police force might have a different evaluation than a
private owner).
In addition, the cost associated with an evacuation order for the Authority and an Evacuee clearly
changes in relation to the nature of the threat scenario. A terrorist threat in a transient space (e.g.
a transportation terminal such as an airport or a train/metro station) would most likely be associ-
ated with w˜ E < w˜ A, i.e., a relatively lower cost for the Evacuee’s Leave decision for the Evacuee (as
the loss of productivity is lower) than the Authority (who instead would have to take political/legal
responsibility for such decision). Therefore, no cry wolf effect should be observed in such cases.
Based on the previous considerations, cases 4 and 5 are among the most interesting ones. Case
4 involves the Authority giving an evacuation order in some instances even if the signal received is
xn . This is the case of the cry wolf effect: the Authority’s technology, threat assessment capabilities
and information available is relatively good but not good enough to persuade the Evacuee that the
threat is high enough for him/her to leave. In addition, the Evacuee values their work considerably
(relatively)more than the Authority. Therefore the Authority, in order tomake the Evacuee leavemore
often, gives an evacuation order O even in some of the cases when he/she observes xn . It should be
noticed that for this to be the case, we need that the Authority actually wants the Evacuee to leave
independent of his/her information (i.e. the main scope of the Authority is instruction compliance).
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The “ideal” situation is case number 5 where the Authority gives an evacuation order if, and only if
he/she receives the signal xt and the Evacuee evacuates for surewhenhe/she receives the evacuation
order.
The proposedmodel focuses on the study of the interaction between the Authority’s decision and
the subsequent Evacuee’s response to either leave or stay. Therefore, themodel does not consider the
case of an authority “pushing” an evacuation to get 100% compliance once an Evacuee has decided
to stay, as this would result in case which does not consider the interactions between the authority’s
evacuation orders and Evacuee’s reactions to them. Similarly, the model does not take into consider-
ation the case in which an Evacuee takes a decision to evacuate on its own (i.e. without Authority’s
action) as the focus of the paper is to isolate the relationship between Authority’s order and subse-
quent Evacuee’s actions.
Despite these limitations, themodel presented in this paper represents an important step to eval-
uate how egress drills can be associated with the cry wolf effect. The question which arises is what
changes can be made to remedy the cry wolf effect, i.e., to turn a cry wolf situation into an “ideal”
one in which order compliance is high. Looking at the model results, all that is needed is to decrease
γn , so that it is below
w˜ A+c˜
1−p . In this way, an Authority receiving a low threat signal loses his/her in-
centive to order an evacuation. In response to that, the Evacuee always evacuates when receiving
the evacuation order, knowing that it must have been given by the xt Authority type. For γn to be
reduced, what needs to be done is to increase the precision of the signal, i.e. τ. Therefore, if the Au-
thority canobtain a clearer signal and theEvacuee knows that, then the crywolf effect canbe avoided.
Interestingly, increasing the cost c of giving an evacuation order can also lead to the cry wolf effect
being avoided. This corresponds to an increase in the credibility of the evacuation order given by
the Authority but it is wasteful, in contrast to increasing the accuracy of threat detection. The key
implication of the model is that the Authority should alwaysmention the danger associated with the
situation (i.e. announced evacuation drills may be recommended). In this sense, our simple model
suggests that unannounced drills would reduce the credibility of evacuation orders, thus their use
should be carefully evaluated and they must ideally be associated with benefits other than just train-
ing and procedure assessment (for instance unannounced drills can be used for data collection on
human behaviour that can be used for design andmodelling purposes [50]). In other words, training
benefits should be evaluated in light of the cry wolf efficiencies. In addition, the model suggests that
the best way to avoid the (potentially large) inefficiency associated with the cry wolf effect is to invest
in better detection of threat situations.
It is important to note that the proposed model includes a generic parametric analysis and an
explanatory simple case study, and its applicability and validation to complex scenarios should be
further evaluated in the context of existing evacuation research. The few existing data sets on this is-
sue generally present behavioural intentions (i.e. hypothetical actions that peoplewoulddo in case of
an evacuation scenario) or post-disaster surveys for different types of evacuation scenarios [8,51–55].
Unfortunately, those data sets often refer to the analysis of a scenario in isolation rather than evac-
uation behaviour during the passage of time and only a few studies investigate the issue of repeated
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evacuations (including the cry wolf effect) [56, 57]. Therefore, the proposed model represents a use-
ful tool to look deeper into the interactions between the decisions of the evacuee and the authority’s
order/recommendation. Previous studies [8] refer to the fact that authorities who make evacuation
orders are “faced with tension between making evacuation orders based on incomplete predictions
of information provided by other agencies and avoiding making a false alarm or false evacuation or-
der.” The model proposed in this paper provides the possibility to consider different cases, which
cover different interactions between the strategies of the authority and the evacuees and the infor-
mation available to them. The model also allows for investigation of the relationship between the
information quality (i.e. the accuracy of threat detection) available, previous evacuation experience
and the resulting behaviour. The proposedmodel further allows for the study of causal links between
the information quality (based on the available technology) and unnecessary evacuation experience,
a well-known issue in the evacuation literature [8,56].
Future work should investigate in depth the cases of sensitive facilities which involve an Evacuee
with a dual role, i.e. he/she can decrease the consequences of the threat (e.g. a threat in a nuclear
power plant in which the presence of the Evacuee can reduce its consequences [58]). Such complex
cases would require a more refined representation of the costs associated with the evacuation for
both the Authority and the Evacuee. The simple model proposed here also did not explicitly con-
sider the impact of social influence in evacuation decision making among the evacuees [59]. Future
studies should evaluate themutual relationships associated with the Leave decision among different
Evacuees whomay receive the same or different signals.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a game-theoretic approach to investigate the cry wolf effect in emergency evac-
uation scenarios, presenting an evacuation gamemodel andan exampleof its parameterisation. Pos-
sible equilibria have been obtained analysing the best responses of the Authority and the Evacuee.
Model findings emphasises the need for a careful evaluation of the benefits associated with unan-
nounced evacuation drills, which should go beyond staff and evacuee’s training and assessment of
evacuation procedure in order to counterbalance the possibly negative crywolf effect associatedwith
the decrease of Evacuee’s instruction compliance. In addition, increasing the accuracy of threat de-
tection can prevent large inefficiencies associated with the cry wolf effect.
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